Analysis of Warren Buffett's view on 'buying Japanese assets':

1. First clarify what "Uncle Warren's view" really is

At the 2025 Berkshire Hathaway shareholders meeting, Warren Buffett reiterated:

Continue increasing allocation to non-dollar assets, with particular focus on yen-denominated investments;
Holdings in Japan's five major trading houses (Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi Corp, Mitsui & Co, Sumitomo Corp) will be held "indefinitely", with no concern about future rises in Japanese bond yields.

His main motivations are—

Widening valuation gap between yen and U.S. stocks;
Strong cash flows and increasing buybacks from Japanese companies;
Berkshire can use ultra-low-cost yen debt to replace some dollar financing.

Note: Buffett never publicly claimed that "trade surplus countries are forced to dump dollars"—this is subsequent media speculation.

2. "Surplus countries forced to dump dollars → currency surge → bubble"—Logic chain analysis

Summary: This logic held true for Japan during 1985-1990, but it requires five preconditions simultaneously—most crucially, monetary authorities actively implementing significant easing.

3. How likely is a repeat after 2025?

Marginal scenario probabilities:
Yen: If U.S.-Japan reaches a "Plaza-Lite" agreement, violent yen appreciation + Japan maintains negative rates → localized bubble probability moderate;
China, Germany: Constrained by capital account/fiscal discipline, low probability of 1980s-style "asset explosion".

4. Is Buffett's Japan bet the same logic as "Plaza Accord 2.0"?

Not the same investment thesis. Buffett emphasizes "won't sell even if yen rates rise," showing his focus is on corporate intrinsic returns rather than "policy-driven bubble trades."

5. If "forced dollar dumping → currency surge → rate-cut bubble" occurs, how should investors think?

Risk control priorities:

Track real effective exchange rates: If 12-month gain >20% with central bank still dovish, bubble risks escalate.
Monitor macroprudential indicators: Credit/GDP, price/rent ratios, bank real estate exposure.
"One-size-fits-all" action by major surplus countries is unlikely—country differentiation more probable; don't blindly copy 1980s Japan playbook.

6. Conclusion

1985-1990 Japan did experience "forced currency rise + rate cuts + asset bubble" chain reaction, but it was a product of multiple policy synergies, not equivalent to "dollar reserves = printing second currency."
Today's global surplus patterns, capital controls, and regulatory tools differ fundamentally from the 1980s.
Buffett's Japan move resembles value and funding cost arbitrage, while "surplus countries forced to dump dollars → mega bubble" remains a tail-risk scenario worth monitoring.
If this chain materializes, focus on procyclical assets + FX gains + macroprudential buffers, closely tracking currency appreciation and domestic credit feedback loops.